DURING the last two months in 2011, there were two major international conferences in Istanbul (Turkey) and Bonn (Germany). With the 2014 deadline for the US-led foreign troop withdrawal fast approaching, the international community is frantic about achieving its interests before getting out of Afghanistan. What can India do in this situation?
Despite Islamabad’s negative contribution to peace in Afghanistan, there has been an international recognition that Pakistan is a part of the solution. It appears that Pakistan has succeeded in positioning itself as a central piece in the Afghan chessboard. Where has India positioned itself? What roles does it want to play to protect its own interests? What strategies could New Delhi pursue to improve its position in deciding the future of Afghanistan?
First, an analysis of where India stands among the international community in deciding the future of Afghanistan. While the US and the rest of the international community appreciate New Delhi’s economic investment in Afghanistan, not many of India’s “strategic partners” in the American and European continents would give a blank cheque. While India has already invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan, and is willing to expand further its political and economic footprints, there is an apprehension.
The international hesitation in allowing India to do what it is willing is based on two counts. First, there is an apprehension that India is expanding its intelligence network within Afghanistan to prevent Pakistan from having strategic depth vis-a-vis India. Some even suspect that India is building a coalition within Afghanistan to counter Pakistan’s presence. In short, there is strong suspicion among the international community, and some even openly accuse India of using Afghanistan as a proxy against Pakistan.
Second, a substantial section of the international community, including the US, does not want to offend the sentiments of Islamabad and its military by allowing India to have a larger footprint in Afghanistan. The general belief among this section is that Pakistan’s inputs and involvement are much more important to build a stable Afghanistan. This section acknowledges, at times even publicly, that Pakistan has played a negative role in Afghanistan, yet it would want to work with Islamabad.
With President Hamid Karzai failing to have a stable government in Afghanistan, the above section considers Pakistan much more important for the future of Afghanistan than any other country. This is why, despite regularly accusing the ISI of using the Taliban and the Haqqani network against the international troops and the Karzai government, they still want to work with Pakistan and are willing to exclude India in this process.
Given the importance that Islamabad has succeeded in getting in the estimation of the international community at the cost of reducing the Indian footprint, what can New Delhi do? How can India protect its own interests in Afghanistan and help it to stabilise?
A Delhi conference with substantial inputs from regional countries around Afghanistan will help India achieve its objectives and stabilise the Kabul regime for the following reasons. First, in recent months there have been two international conferences — one in Istanbul and the other in Bonn — during the second week of December. Both conferences had been organised by the international community, which would like to protect its own investments in Afghanistan and help Mr Karzai. The primary purpose behind this analysis is not to criticise India for what it has achieved as a result of these two conferences. The analysis is aimed at finding ways and means so that India can achieve its own objectives.
Second, a Delhi conference is essential to reach out to the regions and countries surrounding Afghanistan. Most countries of Central Asia, Russia and Iran also have substantial interests in Afghanistan, besides Pakistan and China. New Delhi will not be able to protect its interests or investments in Afghanistan on its own. Besides, India, on its own, could only devise strategies to adapt itself to the changing game rather than ambitiously change the game in Afghanistan. Should India play according to the changing game or plan towards changing the game in Afghanistan? A Delhi conference may help India decide its primary objectives and then achieve them.
Iran, Russia and Central Asia, in particular, have substantial interests in what happens in Afghanistan. All these actors have serious reservations about the efforts made by the US and its NATO partners, though they have been taking part in international efforts. Iran is extremely apprehensive of the American interests and presence in Afghanistan. Tehran by now should be convinced that the US troops are not going to leave Afghanistan completely by the end of 2014. There will be a substantial American military presence in Afghanistan, which is not likely to be targeting only the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Tehran has every reason to suspect that the American presence in Afghanistan will be detrimental to its own future. The possibility of Tehran even tactically supporting the Taliban to achieve its short-term objectives cannot be ruled out. Iran may see the Taliban in Kabul as a lesser threat than Mr Karzai collaborating with the US troops.
Central Asian countries and communities like the Uzbeks and the Tajiks have their own objectives to achieve in Afghanistan because of historical linkages and the presence of their brethren in that country. None of the Central Asian countries is comfortable with an Afghanistan totally under the control of a Pashtun leadership — Taliban or otherwise — with substantial linkages with Islamabad. Russia also has the same interests and apprehensions in Afghanistan.
Third, a Delhi conference, if projected as a complementary process and not in competition with the existing international conferences, would fill the gap in the much-needed regional approach towards stabilising Afghanistan. The international community is keenly looking for alternative approaches. During the recent Istanbul conference there was reluctance towards a regional approach among the Afghan neighbours, primarily because it was seen as an American project. If India has to lead the efforts for an alternative process, which is seen as independent one, the regional countries, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran, along with Russia and Afghanistan, may be favoured. Iran and Russia, in particular, will always be apprehensive of any West-led initiative on Afghanistan. While they may not be too anxious to accept the idea of a Delhi dialogue on Afghanistan, they are likely to be less suspicious about an Indian initiative. As mentioned earlier, if it is projected as a complementary process, even the West may be willing to support such an initiative.
For India, a Delhi conference on Afghanistan would provide the much-needed space to work with the neighbours of Afghanistan. From the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline to reviving the old Silk Route, there is much that this conference can focus on like economic, cultural and political issues. Perhaps more on economic and cultural issues and less on political issues, for it should be left to the Afghans to decide what form of government they would like to have. This would not only allow India to work with Afghanistan and its neighbours, but also result in creating regional constituencies within Afghanistan.
Pakistan is likely to remain suspicious and may not take part in such an initiative. So would be China. The objective of a Delhi initiative should not be aimed at isolating Pakistan; India needs to play a role if any initiative on Afghanistan has to succeed. So far as the Chinese role and their investments in Afghanistan are concerned, there has been an exaggeration. Will they make use of a regional initiative, or try to scuttle it? The real question is: Will Pakistan be willing to take part in an Indian initiative?
Irrespective of how Pakistan behaves, India needs to pursue multiple strategies to protect its interests in Afghanistan. A Delhi conference on the lines of the Bonn and Istanbul conferences may give the much-needed space to India to enlarge its footprint in Afghanistan.
No comments:
Post a Comment